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ABSTRACT 
 
A wave of recent cross-national research has pointed to the positive consequences for coun-
tries with high levels of ‘quality of government’ (QoG), broadly defined, such as corruption, 
impartiality, and quality of public services (Mauro 2004; Norris 2012; Holmberg et al 2009). 
Yet the question of how QoG varies at the sub-national level is still widely overlooked. To 
address it, we present the third round of data from the regional ‘European Quality of Gov-
ernment’ (EQI) survey (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014; Charron, Lapuente and Roth-
stein 2013), collected in 2017 and built upon the opinions of 78.000 respondents from 202 
regions from 21 European countries. The data provides several contributions to the litera-
ture. First, while the majority of QoG-type indices rely on expert assessments, the EQI relies 
on the assessments of citizens, who are the on-the-ground consumers of public services. 
Second, the data begins to show trends on QoG variation over time, as well as across Euro-
pean regions. Consequently, this data is the most comprehensive sub-national data to date; 
mapping of QoG within and across EU countries over the past decade. Building on previous 
rounds of data collected in 2010 and 2013, the 2017 EQI, which is published free for schol-
arly use, the EQI builds on both perceptions and experiences of citizens in public service 
areas such as health care, education, and law enforcement. This paper presents the final re-
sults of the survey, sensitivity analyses and checks for external and internal validity, as well 
as the preliminary that we detect across European regions. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the past two decades, a growing body of evidence supports the hypothesis that the “quality of 
government” – understood as a government that acts in an impartial, efficient way, and without 
corruption – is a crucial factor for explaining the remarkable differences in socio-economic perfor-
mance across political communities. Scholars have pointed to a host of negative consequences for 
countries that demonstrate sufficiently low levels of quality of government (QoG) (Mauro 2004; 
Norris 2012; Holmberg et al 2009).  The cross-country empirical literature has found that states that 
suffer from high corruption, weak rule of law, and low impartiality are associated with, among other, 
lower levels of economic development (Mauro 2004), poorer health (Holmberg and Rothstein 2012), 
poorer environmental outcomes (Welsch 2004), greater income inequality (Gupta et al. 2002), lower 
levels of happiness (Veenhoven 2010), and lower overall subjective well-being (Helliwell and Huang 
2008). 
While the vast amount of work on governance and corruption studies in a comparative perspective 
has focused on the national level (Kaufman et al 2011), a recent surge in studies focusing on the sub-
national level have shown that regional differences in the quality of governance are at times greater 
than national ones (Tabellini 2010; Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014, 2015; Rodríguez-Pose, and 
Garcilazo 2015).  There are regions with high quality of government – such as those in Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands, but also some Northern regions in Italy or Spain – and regions with low 
quality of government – mostly in Eastern and Southern Europe, but not only there –. These differ-
ences do not always coincide with national borders. There can be regions with very diverse levels of 
quality of government within the same country, such as in Italy, Belgium, France or Romania. 
This paper asks which the current level of quality of government in European regions is and how it 
has changed over time since it was first recorded by the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) 
survey in 2010 (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014). The paper maps out both spatial and temporal 
patterns in regional and national governance for EU countries with the help of the third wave of the 
EQI survey, conducted in 2017. The paper is organized as follows. Section II justifies theoretically 
the importance of attempting to measure the level of quality of government across different Euro-
pean political units. Section III explains how quality of government across Europe has previously 
been measured. Section IV presents the questions included in the 2017 EQI survey. Section V de-
scribes how the EQI index of European regions is built from the answers to those questions. Section 
VI discusses the preliminary cross-time trends in quality of government we see from the 2010 EQI 
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to the 2017 EQI. Section VII concludes with a discussion of the main findings and their potential 
implications for policy-makers, particularly for cohesion policy.  
II. Why Measure the Quality of Government of European Regions 
Despite an initial goal of the European Union was the convergence in well-being of European citizens 
irrespective of the territory they live, there is evidence pointing out that regional divergence has ac-
tually increased over time, in terms of economic growth, productivity, and employment (Farole, 
Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2011:1090). Over time, there has been a slow process of peripheral re-
gions in the European periphery catching up with core regions. Yet, at the same time, some differ-
ences between well-off and worse-off regions within the same country have risen. Up to a certain 
extent, the growing differences between countries and between regions within countries owe a lot to 
the asymmetric impact of the financial crisis (Berkowitz, Von Breska, Pienkowski and Rubianes 
2015).  
However, researchers note that the different regional performances are also the result of the formal 
and informal institutions prevailing in a region either now (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2011) 
or historically (Tabellini 2010). There is thus a growing consensus within both policy and academic 
circles that the quality of institutions and governments makes “an important difference for economic 
development” (Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo 2015:1275). There are numerous indications that so-
cio-economic disparities among regions are due to differences in the governance of public institutions 
(Charron, Dijkstra, and Lapuente 2014, 2015). There is a very high correlation between, on the one 
hand, a regional indicator or quality of government, and, on the other, all sort of variables capturing 
the well-being of a community, such as from economic inequality and gender inequality, to unem-
ployment and educational levels, infant mortality, and social trust. 
Correlations sometimes implies causation, and the quality of institutions – and, in particular, the con-
cept of quality of government (QoG) – has recently emerged as “a key factor” for understanding 
gaps in development across nations (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009) or European regions 
(Charron and Lapuente 2013). Governments with high QoG – that is to say governments that are 
impartial in the exercise of power, and do not discriminate along political, cultural, ethnic lines, and 
that have low corruption (Rothstein and Teorell 2008) – deliver essential public goods and facilitate 
processes. These, in turn, are conducive to economic growth and social development, ultimately ex-
plaining national, regional or local divergences in socio-economic development (Charron and 
Lapuente 2013; Pike, Rodríguez-Pose and Tomaney 2007; Rodríguez-Pose and Garcilazo, 2015). A 
  5 
government with high quality of government facilitates economic interactions (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo 2015:1276) and is the strongest determinant of social trust (Charron and Rothstein 2014:2). 
On the contrary, territories with low levels of quality of government endure lower levels of economic 
development (Mauro 2004), higher income inequality (Gupta et al. 2002), and worse environmental 
outcomes (Welsch 2004). 
To study quality of government, scholars use the following proxies: control of corruption, rule of 
law, government effectiveness, or protection of property rights (Charron and Lapuente 2013). Irre-
spective of the type of data or methodology employed to construct them, these indicators are highly 
correlated (Kaufman et al 2011). The same polities – national or sub-national governments – tend to 
be at the top (like Denmark and the Netherlands in Europe) or at the bottom (like Greece or Romania 
in Europe) of the rankings. That is, these different indicators of government performance do seem 
to capture a latent variable, a common denominator of how the public sector operates in a territory. 
Consequently, “it makes sense to talk about the quality of government as a general feature of coun-
tries” (Tabellini 2008:263).  
In other words, analyzing the quality of government in a territory is fundamental for understanding 
why some regions within not only the same continent (Europe), but also within the same country – 
think of the well-known differences between Northern and Southern Italian regions, or Wallonia and 
Flanders in Belgium – presents divergence socio-economic indicators. And, therefore, exploring the 
causes of differences in quality of government has attracted the attention of a wide range of scholars 
of comparative politics, economics, law and history, especially during the latest two decades (see for 
example La Porta et al. 1999; Persson and Tabellini 2005; Rothstein 2011; Treisman 2007). The latter 
task is outside the scope of this paper. We will focus here on describing those differences in quality 
of government across European regions – a first and crucial step, to try to understand what explains 
them. 
III. How Quality of Government has been measured within EU Coun-
tries 
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The European Quality of Government Index (‘EQI’) builds on a previously published data from 2010 
(Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein 2013; Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014) and from 2013 (Char-
ron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2015)1.  It has had a wide impact in research on the EU, economic geog-
raphy and entrepreneurship and innovation at the sub-national level since its conception and has 
been included as a part of multiple rounds of EU Cohesion reports published by the Commission.  
Based on one of the largest regionally-focused surveys to date, the 2017 data draws on over 78,000 
respondents in 192 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions in 21 countries2.  Together with national estimates 
from the World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2011), we report data on 
Quality of Government (‘QoG’) for all EU 28 countries, for a total of 220 political units345.. The 
QoG questions are based around a conceptual framework which views QoG as a broad, latent multi-
dimensional concept consisting of high impartiality and quality of public service delivery, along 
with low corruption.  The survey thus aimed at capturing average citizens’ perceptions and experi-
ences with corruption, and the extent to which they rate their public services as impartial and of good 
quality in their region of residence. 
The EQI data intends to provide scholars and policy makers with a more nuanced metric when 
comparing governance across political units in Europe and is the first to provide comparable QoG 
data that can be used to compare regions within and across countries. The 2013 data follows closely 
the method used to build the EQI in 2010, which has been published in several top journals (see 
Charron and Lapuente 2013 and Charron, Dijkstra and Lapunete 2014).   
                                                     
1 Data was originally funded by the EU Commission (REGIO) and published in a report by Charron, Lapuente and Roth-
stein (2010).  Report can be found here: http://nicholascharron.wordpress.com/current-projects/regional-
qog-in-the-european-union/  
2 NUTS stands for ‘Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’ and more can be read about this at: http://epp.eu-
rostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  
Kosovo is included, and because it is technically still a region in Serbia according to the EU, it is coded as such here as 
well.  The 2010 and 2013 rounds had 33,000 and 85,000 respondent respectively.   
3 The 2017 round of survey data and research was funded by the EU Commission in a competitive Tender “Measuring 
Quality of Government and Sub-national variation”.  Previous round in 2013 was funded by the Commission via ANTI-
CORRP project and contained Turkey and Serbia in the sample. 
4 The 2017 round of survey data and research was funded by the EU Commission via an EU Tender “Measuring Quality 
of Government and Sub-National Variation” 
5 NUTS stands for ‘Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’ and more can be read about this at: http://epp.eu-
rostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction  
Kosovo is included, and because it is technically still a region in Serbia according to the EU, it is coded as such here as 
well. 
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While this round of data largely builds on the work of previous rounds, there are several alterations 
based on suggestions from a Rasch analysis of the 2010, and 2013 rounds of the EQI data (Annoni 
and Charron 2017), as well as moving Hungary from the NUTS 1 to NUTS 2 level.  In this document, 
we highlight the sample, summary statistics and question items that are included in the 2017 round 
of the EQI.  The regional level data is comprised of 18 QoG-focused questions6 from our large 
citizen-based survey, which are aggregated to the regional level in each country. The next section 
briefly outlines the method of aggregation, weighting of variables, and the combination with national 
level QoG data, yet more information can be found in previous publications.  All regional and na-
tional level data used in the index is made freely available so that scholars can replicate the data if 
they so choose, or use individual indicators that more suit their needs.  For example, those interested 
in a particular public sector area, such as health care, education or elections, can reference individual 
question or aggregated indicators regionally.  In addition, corruption perception and experiences are 
distinguished.    
 
IV. The EQI Survey Questions 
Prior to highlighting the survey questions used to build the EQI, two issues in the preparation of this 
study are worthy of mention here.  First, in some areas, such as immigration, customs, defence or the 
judicial arena, we do not expect much variation from region to region within countries at all.  Thus 
to maximize regional variation on the QoG-oriented question in the survey, we elected to limit the 
questions in the survey to only those policy areas that are most often either governed or administered 
by sub-national bodies.  In the end, three policy areas were selected – health care, education and law 
enforcement.  In addition to these three policy areas, we also inquire with one question each about 
the integrity of regional elections as well as the impartiality of the tax authorities. More information 
about the survey and sample can be found in the appendix.   
The second issue to deal with is the fact that in some countries – such as Germany, Belgium, Italy or 
Spain – the regions that we are targeting in the questions are both politically and administratively 
meaningful.  That is to say that these regional governments are elected by their local constituents, 
                                                     
6 In prior years, the number of questions was 16.  This year, an additional experience with corruption question was added 
as well as a question about the extent to which people feel they are treated fairly by the tax authorities.   
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and that these governments have their own autonomous revenues (either from directly taxing citi-
zens, or central government transfers or both) and have a degree of autonomy with which to redis-
tribute resources in the form of public services.  However, in more politically centralized countries, 
such as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia or Portugal, this issue becomes more challenging, as their rele-
vant administrative level corresponds to NUTS3, which would have exceeded our budget to sample 
on.  So while the regions that we are targeting (NUTS 1 or NUTS 2) while meaningful in the sense 
that EU development funds are targeted directly to them and that Eurostat reports annual data on 
them, they have in some cases been mainly an invention for EU statistical purposes, yet not politically 
meaningful.  Therefore asking a respondent in some cases ‘how would you rate the quality ‘X’ service 
in your region of ‘Y’’ might be very confusing, since respondents from countries like Hungary or 
Romania might not recognize that they are even living in region ‘Y’.  It can therefore be argued that 
the administrative and political responsibility of the regions in these three public services varies in 
different countries and thus this may be problematic for this data gathering.  However this study 
argues otherwise, in that we attempt to capture all regional variation within a country and, as several 
other scholars have noted (e.g. Tabellini 2010; Charron and Lapuente 2013), there are numerous 
empirical indications and anecdotal evidence pointing out that the provision and quality of public 
services controlled by a powerful central government can nonetheless largely vary across different 
regions. 
In the 2010 and 2013 rounds, in order to synthesize the survey and make the results as comparable 
between and within countries as possible, we asked respondents about questions focusing around 
three key concepts of QoG – the ‘quality’ of the services themselves, the extent to which they are 
administered ‘impartiality’ and extent to which ‘corruption’ exists in their area.  In countries where the 
NUTS region is not recognizable, we continue with this approach.  However, in 2017, for countries 
with politically relevant regions, we elected to attempt to maximize validity and regional variation at 
the regional level by substituting the local word for the regional level in question in lieu of ‘in your 
area’.  For example, in Germany, a respondent would hear the phrase ‘in your Bundesland’. 
While some slight changes have occurred through the three years, we begin however by highlighting 
the ‘core’ questions that have remained in the three rounds of the survey over time. 
First, in question 4-6 in the current survey, respondents rate the quality of their three public services 
in question on a scale of ‘1’ (extremely poor quality) to ‘10’ (extremely high quality): 
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4. ‘How would you rate the quality of public education in your area7?’ (edqual) 
5. ‘How would you rate the quality of the public health care system in your area?’ (helqual) 
6. ‘How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?’ (lawqual) 
The next six questions try to capture the extent to which public services are delivered impartially in 
the regions of Europe.  ‘Impartiality’ is admittedly a more complicated concept to put forth to re-
spondents than ‘quality’, so we framed this question in two ways –with a more negative tone, and a 
more positive tone.  In the first three questions (7-9), we asked citizens to rate whether they agreed 
that ‘certain people’ get special advantages when dealing with the public service in question from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).  The second set of questions (10-12) asks respondents 
whether all people in their region are ‘treated equally’ by the service in question on a four point scale 
(1. Agree, 2. Rather agree, 3. Rather disagree or 4. Disagree).  We use all six questions in the final index to 
allow for as much variation as possible while not letting either the ‘positively’ or ‘negatively’ framed 
question determine the impartiality data alone. 
7. “Certain people are given special advantages in the public education system in my area.” (edimpart1) 
8. “Certain people are given special advantages in the public health care system in my area.” (helimpart1) 
9. “The police force gives special advantages to certain people in my area.” (lawimpart1) 
10. “All citizens are treated equally in the public education system in my area” (edimpart2) 
11. “All citizens are treated equally in the public health care system in my area” (helimpart2) 
12. “All citizens are treated equally by the police force in my area” (lawimpart2) 
The next three questions deal with respondents’ perception of the extent to which corruption is 
present in their public services, along with a general question of how often they believe that ‘others 
in their area’ use corruption to obtain public services.  Again, perceptions may not capture the full 
story, however, as Kaufman et al (2009:3) argue “perceptions matter because agents base their actions 
on their perceptions, impression, and views”, thus if citizens believe their public services are ineffi-
cient or corruption, they are less likely to use their services, likewise with foreign firms and investment 
                                                     
7 In cases where countries have politically relevant or recognizable regions at the NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 level in question, 
we substitute this phrase with the regional name.   
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in countries perceived to be plagued with problems of rent-seeking and public sector mismanage-
ment8.  However, we complement these questions with additional questions about respondents’ ac-
tual experience with bribery later on.  The first three questions are scaled as 1-10, with ‘1’ being 
“strongly disagree” and ‘10’ being “strongly agree”.   
13. “Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system” (edcorr) 
14. “Corruption is prevalent in the public health care system in my area” (helcorr) 
15. “Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area” (lawcorr) 
The following two question constitute a slight change from the previous 2010 and 2013 rounds, 
whereby instead of asking citizens about either ‘how often others engage in bribery to obtain public 
services’ (2010), or asking respondents about corruption for ‘special advantages’ (2013), we split these 
ideas of so called ‘need’ and ‘greed’ corruption (Bauhr 2014) into the following two questions (1-10, 
with ‘1’ being “strongly disagree” and ‘10’ being “strongly agree”) 
16a. People in my area must use some form of corruption to just to get some basic public services 
16b. Corruption in my area is used to get access to special unfair privileges and wealth. 
In addition to corruption perceptions questions, we ask about citizens’ direct experience with corrup-
tion.  In contrast to 2010 and 2013, where we only inquired about whether a respondent paid a bribe 
for one of the public service in question, we add whether the respondent was asked to pay a bribe by 
a public sector employee at one of the services in question so as to attempt to capture the direction 
of who is the ‘initiator’.  For the final index, we code a respondent as ‘1’ for Q17 or 18 if they 
answered ‘yes’ to any of the four sub-questions. 
17. In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family been asked by a public official to give an informal gift or 
bribe in: (a): Education services? (b): Health or medical services? (c): Police? d) any other public service? ‘(yes/no)’ 
(bribe) 
18. ‘In the past 12 months have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to: (a): Education 
services? (b): Health or medical services? (c): Police? d) any other public service? ‘(yes/no)’ (bribe) 
                                                     
8 In addition, Charron (2016) shows that the relationship between aggregated citizen perceptions and experiences with 
corruption is quite strong, and moreover, highly correlated with expert assessments. 
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Taking a brief look at the responses on these previous two questions, Table 1 reports the cross-
tabulations.  We see a slight increase in the percentage of respondents who claim to have paid a bribe 
in the past 12 months for a service – 9.1% of the sample in total, compared with 7.8% in 2013.  We 
also see that 6.8% were asked to pay.  However, lower left and upper right columns reveal something 
quite interesting – just less than half of respondents who were asked to pay, did not (lower left), while 
61.5% (4358/7088) of those who did pay a bribe were not asked to do so by a bureaucrat working in 
the service sector in question, thus we might conclude that the bribe was initiated by the respondent.   
TABLE 1, (CROSS-TABULATION SUMMARY OF CORRUPTION EXPERIENCE) 
   payB_ANY    
askB_ANY no  yes Total  
       
no 68,153 4,358 72,511 (93.20%) 
yes 2,557 2,730 5,287 (6.80%) 
     
Total 70,710 7,088 77,798  
 (90.90%) (9.10%)   
Note: unweighted totals reported.  ‘ask’ and ‘pay’ combine ‘yes’ responses from a-d in the previous two ques-
tions.  
 
Finally, we ask about two other relevant regional aspects of QoG, namely the extent to which cor-
ruption is present in their area’s elections and the respondents’ view of how fair the tax authorities 
are.  In previous rounds, we inquired about one’s trust in their area’s media in reporting on matters 
of corruption in the public sector and among politicians.  As our media question from previous 
rounds produced suspect results (Annoni and Charron 2018), we now inquire about the impartiality 
of the tax authorities. 
Q19-20: Please respond to the following 2 questions with the following ('1' strongly disagree - '10' strongly agree) 
Q18: “Elections in my area are clean from corruption” (elections) 
Q20: The tax authorities in my area treat all people equally (tax) 
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Table 2 summarizes the survey questions that go into the final index, grouping the questions in to 
one of the three pillar dimensions – corruption, impartiality or quality.   
TABLE 2, (SUMMARY OF EQI SURVEY QUESTION ITEMS) 
Pillar Variable Description Variable name in dataset 
Corruption Items       
a. perceptions       
  corruption in education stEdCorr 
  corruption in health care stHelCorr 
  corruption in law enforcement stLawCorr 
  need corruption   stNeedCorr 
  greed corruption   stGreedCorr 
  elections clean from corruption stElecCorr 
b. experiences       
  asked to pay a bribe for public service stnoAskB_any1 
  paid a bribe for public service stnopayB_any1 
          
Impartiality Items       
  some  get special advantages in education stEdImpart1 
  some  get special advantages in health care stHelImpart1 
  some get special advantages in law enforcement stLawImpart1 
  all treated equally in education stEdImpart2 
  all treated equally in health care stHelImpart2 
  all treated equally in law enforcement stLawImpart2 
   all treated equally by tax authorities stTaxImpart 
          
Quality Items       
  quality of education   stEdQual 
  quality of health care   stHelQual 
  quality of law enforcement stLawQual 
 
V. Construction of the EQI 
In this section, we briefly highlight the steps in building the indicator.  For more thorough infor-
mation, see Charron, Lapuente and Rothstein (2013).   As there are undoubtedly much unobserved 
country-level factors that are not measured in our regional survey, we elect to anchor our regional 
estimates with country-level QoG data from the World Bank’s ‘World Governance Indicators (WGI).   
In the two previous rounds, we have taken the four indicators: ‘control of corruption’, ‘government effective-
ness’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘voice and accountability’ and combined them into one composite index (equal 
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weighting)9, around which the regional estimates were centered.  The data is taken for the most recent 
year of publication (in this case 2015)10. Then, the combined WGI data is standardized for the EU 
sample. This figure is used as country’s mean score in the EQI for all countries in the sample so as 
to combine those countries outside the survey with those in it as well as to ‘anchor’ the regional QoG 
estimates in a national context that is not captured by the regionally-based survey questions11.      
The regional data itself combines 18 survey questions about QoG in the region (see Table 2 – and 
Table A3 in the appendix for a correlation matrix for the 18 indicators). As noted, the questions are 
centered on three QoG concepts: ‘quality’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘corruption’, with the latter having two 
sub-groups consisting of perceptions and experience questions respectively. In building the regional 
index, we adjust each variable so that higher numbers equate to higher QoG and then the 18 ques-
tions/indicators to three pillars based on factor analysis12; then we averaged these three pillars to-
gether to form the final index figure for each region. After each stage of aggregation, the data are 
standardized. For the seven EU28 countries outside of the regional survey, there is nothing to add 
to the WGI Country score, thus the WGI data is used as the QoG estimate alone, as regional variation 
is unobserved. With respect to countries with the regional data, we set the national average as the 
WGI and explain the within‐country variance using the regional‐level data.  
In this 2017 round we make a few slight adjustments.  First, in order to better make the three main 
dimensions of QoG – corruption, impartiality and quality – more comparable over time; we elect to 
center the regional estimates on the pillars rather than the final index.  This means that the questions 
pertaining to corruption for example are centered on the national WGI corruption score for exam-
ple13.  Moreover, we have retroactively adjusted previous years (2010, 2013) so that regional data is 
centered on pillars to make these more comparable over time. Second, the principle component 
analysis pointed to two sub-dimensions within the corruption pillar – items that capture perceptions 
                                                     
9 In addition, we underwent extensive sensitivity testing of each of these 4 pillars of QoG from the World Bank and found 
the data to be highly robust. For a closer look at the sensitivity tests and results for the EU sample of countries see 
Charron, Nicholas. 2010. “Assessing The Quality of the Quality of Government Data: A Sensitivity Test of the World Bank 
Government Indicators.” QoG Working paper.  
10 The latest national-level WGI scores by country and indicator can be found in appendix table 2a. 
11 Charron et al. 2013 provides more on this point. 
12 Results of the factor analysis can factor weights are found in the appendix 2, Table A.3 of this paper.  In all years, the 
underlying pillars were determined by the concepts, and confirmed with a principle component factor analysis.   
13 Corruption indicators are centered on the WGI’s ‘control of corruption’ indicator, impartiality items are centered around 
the WGI’s ‘rule of law’ index, and quality items are centered on the WGI’s ‘government effectiveness’ and ‘voice and 
accountability’ measures.  
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and experiences respectively.  These items are thus aggregated into sub-pillars of corruption (yet not 
centered on WGI), and then combined with equal weighting into the corruption pillar.  The ‘roadmap’ 
so to speak of the aggregation process can be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1, (EQI 2017 ROADMAP) 
 
FINAL INDEX EQI2017
PILLARS Quality Impartiality Corruption
SUB-PILLARS perceptions experience
INDICATORS edqual edimpart1 edcorr noaskbribe
helqual helimpart1 helcorr nopaybribe
lawqual lawimpart1 lawcorr
edimpart2 needcorr
helimpart2 greedcorr
lawimpart2 eleccorr
taximpart  
VI. The 2017 EQI and comparisons over time 
The full list of EQI estimates for this 2017 data can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.  In this 
section, these 2017 estimates are compared with those from the previous two years.  The three figures 
below highlight the spatial patterns in governance according to the EQI index.  In each case, the 
number of units is the same to make comparisons over time more valid and previous years have been 
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adjusted to match the methodology of the 2017 approach14.  Units in blue (red) are above (below) 
the mean score of the EQI, with darker regions representing the more extreme ends of the scale.   
FIGURE 2, (EQI 2017) 
 
FIGURE 3, (EQI 2013) 
                                                     
14 Retroactive changes were made to previous years when new countries/regions were added in order to make more 
valid comparisons.  Due to the process of standardization, the simple fact of adding or subtracting units that are below or 
above the mean can impact the scores of other units artificially, which we sought to avoid.  For example, the 2017 tracked 
Hungary at NUTS 2 level (seven regions), while in previous years it was tracked at the NUTS 1 level (three regions).  To 
compare across time, we thus calculated Hungary with seven regions for all three years, with the NUTS 1 level data 
providing a fixed effect so to speak for NUTS 2 level estimates.  
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FIGURE 4, (EQI 2010) 
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Observable patters 
 QoG tends to be stable over time.  EQI index correlations and Spearman Rank coefficients 
across years are all over 0.9 for the index on whole, and 0.82 and greater for the individual 
pillars, as shown in Table 3.  Further analysis in the subsequent section show that just 11.5% 
and 16.9% of units in the sample have had a significant change (p<0.05 or p<0.10 respec-
tively) in score (positive or negative) during the time span. This finding is quite consistent 
with country level data that shows that time trends in governance are remarkably ‘sticky’ 
(Andersson and Heywood 2009). 
 
 
 
TABLE 3, (PAIRWISE CORRELATION OF EQI AND PILLARS ACROSS TIME) 
variable EQI 2017 
quality 
2017 
impartity 
2017 
corrupt-
ion 2017 
EQI 
2013 
quality 
2013 
impartity 
2013 
corrupt-
ion 2013 
EQI 
2010 
quality 
2010 
impartity 
2010 
quality 2017 0.955           
impartity 2017 0.973 0.893          
corruption 2017 0.965 0.870 0.920         
EQI 2013 0.938 0.894 0.914 0.907        
quality 2013 0.906 0.887 0.875 0.859 0.971       
impartity 2013 0.919 0.868 0.907 0.883 0.978 0.927      
corruption 2013 0.918 0.858 0.889 0.909 0.973 0.913 0.934     
EQI 2010 0.913 0.862 0.903 0.875 0.953 0.922 0.936 0.927    
quality 2010 0.873 0.843 0.858 0.824 0.928 0.922 0.902 0.887 0.967   
impartity 2010 0.885 0.827 0.887 0.844 0.907 0.863 0.914 0.873 0.973 0.910  
corruption 2010 0.900 0.839 0.884 0.880 0.939 0.898 0.909 0.939 0.971 0.905 0.922 
Note: Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficient reported.  All correlations significant,  p<0.001 
 Geography still matters: yet a bit less so in 2017 than in 2010.  In the earliest round of the 
EQI, we observed a clear East-West pattern whereby all regions and countries of the former 
socialist bloc were below the EU28 mean in the EQI, with southern EU15 states and regions 
(albeit more spread out in some cases) in the next group, followed by a group of strong 
performing northern countries and regions.  While this pattern to a large degree persists, 
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there are several cases where we observe that areas from newer member state (NMS13) have 
risen just at, or above the mean score: the Czech regions of Jihovychod (CZ06), Stredni 
Morava (CZ07) and the country of Estonia (EE).  Moreover, several other regions have 
made considerable progress in governance convergence, namely Prague region (CZ01) and 
Pomorskie (PL63) in Poland; several regions in Poland and Lithuania have all progressed 
near the EU28 average.  On the other hand, while the Northern parts of the EU28 have 
remained strong, the south of Europe has slid, led by decline in Italian, Greek and many 
Spanish regions, yet Portugal and some regions in Northern Spain have made some slight 
increases since 2010.   
 Countries with lower QoG tend to have wider divergence of QoG at the sub-national level, 
as can be generally observed in Figure 5.  This is a trend that has remained since 2010.  Top 
performers, such as Finland, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands show no significant 
regional variation (Åland (FI20) maybe is an exception scoring so high).  And despite being 
federal countries, places like Germany and Austria have much less regional variation in their 
QoG than countries like Bulgaria or Czech Republic which are more centralized.  Countries 
at or below the EU mean for the EQI tend to be the ones with the largest regional variation 
– Italy, Spain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Portugal (in some cases), with Belgium and France 
being somewhat exceptional in this case.  A counter example is also Poland, which has 16 
provinces with political significance, clear East/West/South historical differences in culture 
and development, yet has consistently shown moderate levels of regional variation in all three 
years of the data.  However, the northern region of Pomorskie (PL63) has made improve-
ments and is significantly stronger than most other Polish provinces in the data. 
 
FIGURE 5, (EQI 2017 IN COUNTRY RANK ORDER AND REGIONAL VARIATION) 
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Note: triangles represent country estimates, while hollow grey circles represent EQI estimates of regions.   
 
 Some countries have persistent and large gaps in QoG: Italy, Belgium and France.  In these 
cases, there is a clear geographic divide - north-south In Italy and Belgium in particular - 
that persists in each of the three rounds and is highly significant according to our margin of 
error calculations.  In Belgium in all cases, the Flemish speaking region of Vlaams Gewest 
(BE2) outperforms the Wallonie (BE3) region as well as the capital region of Brussels 
(BE1).  BE2 stands out in particular with citizen satisfaction of the quality of public ser-
vices and how they are delivered impartiality, as this region is an EU28 leader on several 
indicators, while the other two regions are near or below the EU mean on such indicators.  
In the case of Italy, the south is a consistent low performer both within Italy and through-
out the EU28, while the Northern regions, in particular the smaller Alpine regions of 
Trento, Bolzano, Friuli and Valle d’Aosta, are consistently higher performers on all under-
lying items and are above or just below the EU28 mean score.  Although in the 2017 round 
we do observe a slight move toward convergence, as the northern regions show a modest 
decline. In France we observe a stand-out region in each of the three rounds: Bretagne, 
with the western part of the country in the next group of region, followed by the northeast 
and southern regions with the overseas regions lagging significantly behind.   
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 Some countries have demonstrated a growing divergence in QoG: Spain and Czech Re-
public.  The 2017 data show a widening gap in the regions of the Czech Republic, and even 
more so in Spain.  For the latter, Spain is now the country with the second most regional 
variation in terms of dispersion in the data (behind Italy).  In fact, while the country aver-
age in the WGI declined by 0.27 (resulting in a drop of 6 places in the national rankings) 
and many regions showed declining score in particular in the south (Andalucía, Valencia), 
several northern regions showed improvement in their EQI scores (Cantabria, Navarra, 
Pais Vasco).  Czech Republic showed several regions with significant improvement – Pra-
gue (CZ01), Jihovychod (CZ06), Stredni Morava (CZ07), while the border region of 
Severozapd (CZ04) has consistently lagged behind and  
 
Can we identify more systematic changes among regions and countries? We seek to identify now if 
any of the units has shown a significant trend in a positive or negative direction in the data over time. 
This is useful to identify potentially interesting case studies and to investigate policy ideas from recent 
success cases, which is the intention for future work within this project.  While three years in a panel 
data set per observation is of course difficult to identify a clear trend, even based on limited obser-
vations, we can do a simple test that can help us reveal and possible time trends in the data.  The 
regression model is specified as the following: 
 𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑟𝑡 = 𝜑𝑟𝑁𝑟 + 𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟(𝑁𝑟 ∗ 𝑡) + 𝜀𝑟𝑡                                            (1) 
Where EQI is the index used to capture institutional quality in region (or country) r in the year t (r = 
1, 2,…. r, and t = 0, 1, and 2, which equate to 2010, 2013 and 2017), and where 𝑁𝑟 = 1 for region r 
and 0 if otherwise, and 𝜀𝑟𝑡 is the error term. The constant term is omitted.  This model can be esti-
mated with simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression, where 𝜑𝑟 elucidates fixed spatial differ-
ences in levels of the EQI and 𝜃𝑟 captures the fixed time effects (e.g. a year count).  The interaction 
term 𝑁𝑟 ∗ 𝑡  thus captures temporal trends in the EQI for each region.  As regards time trends 
within regions over time, the null hypothesis states that there are no significant time trends (e.g. 𝛽𝑟 
is insignificant). Where we observe significant trends (positive or negative) from the baseline year, 
such regions can be considered to have made a significant change in governance.  The interpretation 
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of 𝛽𝑟 is thus the average per year marginal change in the EQI for each region over the two years 
since the baseline year of 2010.   
TABLE 4, (LIST OF REGIONAS WITH SIGNIFICANTLY POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE EQI: 2010-2017).  
Number Nuts code Region name 𝜷𝒓 t-score p value 
1 RO32 Bucharesti 0.671 3.95 0.000 
2 BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.642 3.78 0.000 
3 CZ01 Prague 0.468 2.75 0.003 
4 RO42 Vest 0.467 2.75 0.003 
5 PL63 Pomorskie 0.420 2.47 0.010 
6 LT Lithuania 0.404 2.38 0.010 
7 DE2 Bayern 0.385 2.27 0.016 
8 RO31 Sud-Muntenia 0.373 2.19 0.016 
9 CZ07 Střední Morava 0.369 2.17 0.021 
10 PL22 Slaskie 0.361 2.13 0.024 
11 PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.360 2.12 0.024 
12 PL51 Dolnoslaskie 0.359 2.11 0.033 
13 UKI London 0.357 2.10 0.034 
14 CZ06 Jihovychod 0.348 2.05 0.037 
15 PL41 Wielkopolskie 0.317 1.86 0.059 
16 PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 0.313 1.84 0.067 
17 PL43 Lubuskie 0.309 1.82 0.070 
18 PL34 Podlaskie 0.301 1.77 0.073 
19 PL21 Małopolskie 0.296 1.74 0.079 
20 DE7 Hessen 0.291 1.71 0.082 
21 PL12 Mazowieckie 0.286 1.68 0.085 
 
22 UKG W. Midlands 0.284 1.67 0.089 
      
 
Table 4 reports the results for those regions where we observe a positive significant result (p <0.10).  
Regions in darker blue shade have made a positive trend at p<0.05, while regions in lighter blue shade 
have made a change at the 90% level of confidence.  In total, 14 regions made a significant positive 
change at the 95% level of confidence (or greater), while eight regions made a change at the 90% 
level of confidence.  Several Bulgarian and Romanian regions have made positive advances in the 
data over time, mainly due to their very low rank in the first year.  For example, Bucharest had the 
second lowest score (-2.84) in 2010, and increase to -2.46 and -1.58 in 2013 and 2017 respectively.  
While this constitutes an increase by about 1.25 standard deviations in the data, the region still re-
mains in the bottom 10th percentile of regions in the sample for 2017.  Similar patterns also describe 
the other Romanian and Bulgarian regions on this list.  Other regions on the list, such as Prague, 
Pomorskie, Lithuania and Jihovychod, have made more substantial climbs in the data.  Prague, for 
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example has moved from -1.02 to -0.55 to -0.14 in the three respective years, going from the bottom 
15th percentile to near the median of the sample distribution.  While we see that country averages 
have moved in some cases, Lithuania is the only country to make a significant advance in this time 
period according to the data, an improvement that certainly warrants further investigation.  This list 
does not exclusively cover the EU13 area, but also regions from the EU15 are also on this top list, 
including Bayern, London, West Midlands and Hessen.   Near the 90% level of significance is also 
the region of Navarra (not shown), which is one of the most interesting.  Despite the negative trend 
in country average of Spain over time, as well as the negative decline in many of the (Southern) 
Spanish regions, Navarra (as well as Cantabria and Pais Vasco), has in fact shown steady improvement 
over time from 0.07 to 0.26 to 0.51 in the three years of the data.    
Conversely in Table 5, nine regions made a negative change at the 90% level of confidence or greater.  
The regions with a significant decline in governance assessments include several Italian regions, 
mostly in the north and central part of the country.  In addition, Hungary, Spain and France (overseas 
regions) and the Greek capital region of Athens have regions that have seen a significant decline in 
their EQI scores over time, with the overseas French region of Guyane (FR93) showing the largest 
decline in the data, with an average decline of just over 0.5 a standard deviation in the range of the 
data per year.  In addition, we report the significant positive and negative change by EQI pillar in the 
appendix, Tables A5 and A6.  
 
 
TABLE 5, (LIST F REGIONS WITH SIGNIFICANT NEGATIVE CHANGES IN THE EQI) 
Number Nuts code Region name Beta t-score p value 
1 FR93 Guyane -0.512 -3.02 0.000 
2 ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -0.499 -2.93 0.000 
3 ITF1 Abruzzo -0.431 -2.54 0.001 
4 ITC1 Piemonte -0.394 -2.32 0.003 
5 ES70 Canarias -0.396 -2.33 0.004 
6 EL3 Athens -0.394 -2.32 0.005 
7 ES11 Galicia -0.391 -2.3 0.005 
8 HU32 Észak-Alföld -0.333 -1.96 0.009 
9 RO11 Nord Vest -0.287 -1.69 0.033 
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VII. Conclusions  
At the heart of the EU lies the idea of a growing convergence in the well-being of its citizens, irre-
spective of the territory they live in. Moving towards a greater convergence in socio-economic indi-
cators as well as in quality of government has thus been a priority among EU policy-makers for long. 
Consequently, and especially since the territorial enlargement in the 1980s with the accession of 
Greece, Spain, and Portugal, cohesion has been made a key strategy for supporting regional develop-
ment (European Union 2014). The regional, or cohesion, policy is currently the EU’s main invest-
ment policy. It aims to foster economic, social, and territorial cohesion, and to reduce disparities 
between regions (European Union 2014; 2010).  
Nevertheless, as this paper has shown, divergences in one decisive factor for socio-economic devel-
opment – i.e. the quality of government or capacity to implement policies in an impartial, non-cor-
rupt, and efficient way – are still wide across both European countries and regions. On the one hand, 
the findings of this paper seem in line with the pessimistic literature noting that, instead of regional 
convergence, Europe is experiencing, if any, an increase in regional divergence in terms of economic 
growth, productivity, and employment (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2011:1090).  
On the other hand, there is also a more optimistic interpretation of the results of this paper. Although 
a principal finding of this study is the relatively high stability in quality of government, it is also 
important to note that the old dividing lines in quality of government, between Northern and South-
ern Europe, and very particularly, between Western and Eastern Europe, do seem to be, even if 
slowly, blurring. The divergences in quality of government are not as stark in 2017 as they were in 
2010. And, for instance, we have high-performing Eastern regions that have surpassed many Western 
regions in quality of government, such as Jihovychod (CZ06), or Stredni Morava (CZ07) in the Czech 
Republic, and the country of Estonia (EE). In addition, the list of regions with the most significant 
improvements in quality of government in the period under study is dominated by Eastern regions, 
such as Bucharesti, (RO32) in Romania, Severen tsentralen (BG32) in Bulgaria, Prague (CZ01) in the 
Czech Republic, or Pomorskie (PL63) in Poland. 
In contrast it is regions in Western Europe that are the ones demonstrating the most noticeable 
declines in quality of government, such as Guyane (FR93) in France, Valle d'Aosta (ITC2), Abruzzo 
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(ITF1), or Piemonte (ITC1) in Italy, Canarias (ES70) in Spain, or Athens (EL3) in Greece. Yet regions 
in Western Europe are quite heterogeneous in terms of quality of government. While most regions 
in Northern Europe have remained among the top performers in quality of government, recent years 
have seen a fall of numerous Southern regions, particularly in Italy, Greece and Spain. At the same 
time, most regions in Portugal, as well as some Spanish ones in the northern part of the country, have 
shown improvements since 2010. In other words, geography does seem to matter, but it does not 
fully determine the quality of government in a region. Quality of government does seem to be a 
generally stable characteristic of the regions, but there are also notable changes. 
All in all, this paper has highlighted the variations in governance across European countries and 
regions from the period 2010-2017, using the latest wave of the EQI survey data.  We have mapped 
out regional governance as it stands today and compared with the two previous rounds of the EQI 
survey: 2010 and 2013. Despite the intrinsic value of this quantitative mapping of the quality of gov-
ernment, in order to understand what explains the remarkable regional differences – and the contrast 
between the “stickiness” of the quality of government in some regions and the variability in others – 
further analytical work is in order.  
One first step in the future research aiming at disentangling the factors explaining the increase, or 
decrease, of quality of government across EU regions, could be selecting case study regions that 
either fit – or, quite the opposite, go against – the trend observed in their neighboring regions within 
the same country. Particularly valuable lessons of ‘best practices’ may be extracted from regions that, 
in countries that have hardly experienced an improvement in quality of government (or that actually 
do seem to have worse levels), have nonetheless experienced significant improvements in quality of 
government. For instance, that is the case of Prague (CZ01) in the Czech Republic, Pomorskie (PL63) 
in Poland, or Navarra (ES22) in Spain. 
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APPENDIX 
Appenix 1: Background, Methodology and Sample   
 
The field work began during the month of May, 2017 and were conducted in the local majority lan-
guage in each country/region.  The results were returned to the Quality of Government Institute in 
August, 2017.   
The E.U. regional survey was undertaken by Efficience 3 (E3), a French market-research, survey 
company specializing in public opinion throughout Europe for researchers, politicians and advertis-
ing firms.  E3 has also conducted the 2010 and 2013 rounds of the EQI and were thus familiar with 
the question format and goals of the survey.  E3 conducted the interviews themselves in several 
countries and used sub-contracting partners in others15.  The respondents, from 18 years of age or 
older, were contacted randomly via telephone in the local language. Telephone interviews were con-
ducted via both landlines and mobile phones, with both methods being used in most countries.  De-
cisions about whether to contact residents more often via land or mobile lines was based on local 
expertise of market research firms in each country.  For purposes of regional placement, respondents 
were asked the post code of their address to verify the area/ region of residence if mobile phones 
were used.   
Ideally, a survey would be a mirror image of actual societal demographics – gender, income, educa-
tion, rural-urban, ethnicity, etc.  However, we are not privy to exact demographic distributions; in 
particular at the regional level in most cases, thus imposing artificial demographic lines might lead to 
even more problems than benefits.   We thus sought the next best solution. Based on their expert 
advice, to achieve a random sample, we used what was known in survey-research as the ‘next birthday 
method’.  The next birthday method is an alternative to the so-called quotas method.  When using 
the quota method for instance, one obtains a (near) perfectly representative sample – e.g. a near exact 
proportion of the amount of men, women, certain minority groups, people of a certain age, income, 
etc. However, as one searches for certain demographics within the population, one might end up 
with only ‘available’ respondents, or those that are more ‘eager’ to respond to surveys, which can lead 
to less variation in the responses, or even bias in the results.  The ‘next-birthday’ method, which 
simply requires the interviewer to ask the person who answers the phone who in their household will 
                                                     
15 http://www.efficience3.com/en/accueil/index.html. For names of the specific firms to which Efficience 3 sub-contracted 
in individual countries, please write cati@efficience3.com  
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have the next birthday, still obtains a reasonably representative sample of the population.  The inter-
viewer must take the person who has the next coming birthday in the household (if this person is not 
available, the interviewer makes an appointment), thus not relying on whomever might simply be 
available to respond in the household.  So, where the quota method is stronger in terms of a more 
even demographic spread in the sample, the next-birthday method is stronger at ensuring a better 
range of opinion.  The next-birthday method was thus chosen because we felt that what we might 
have lost in demographic representation in the sample would be made up for by a better distribution 
of opinion.  In attempt to compensate for some key demographic over/under-representation, E3 
provides weights based on age and gender for each region, comparing the sample drawn to actual 
demographic statistics from Eurostat.  In the end, we find variation in response and refusal rates by 
country, which could have to do with many factors including the sensitivity of one of the primary the 
topics at hand – corruption. A breakdown of the sample is listed in the table below by country.  
TABLE 1A, (SAMPLE BY COUNTRY OF 2017 EQI SURVEY) 
COUNTRY 
NUTS level sampled no. NUTS regions Sample per NUTS region Sample 
% total 
sample  
1 France 
2 26 401 
10422 13.4 
2 Belgium 
1 3 450 
1350 1.7 
3 Bulgaria 
2 6 400 
2400 3.1 
4 Czech Republic 
2 8 450 
3600 4.6 
5 Slovakia 
2 4 450 
1800 2.3 
6 Hungary 
2 7* 400 
2800 3.6 
7 Croatia 
2 2 450 
900 1.2 
8 Romania 
2 8 450 
3600 4.6 
9 Finland 
2 5 400 
2000 2.6 
10 Italy 
2 21 400 
8400 10.8 
11 Greece 
1 4 405 
1620 2.1 
12 Portugal 
2 7 400 
2800 3.6 
13 Denmark 
2 5 450 
2250 2.9 
14 Sweden 
1 3 400 
1200 1.5 
15 Germany 
1 16 450 
7200 9.2 
16 UK 
1 12 450 
5400 6.9 
17 Ireland 
2 2 450 
900 1.2 
18 Austria 
2 9 450 
4050 5.2 
19 Netherlands 
1 4* 460 
1840 2.4 
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20 Poland 
2 16 403 
6442 8.3 
21 Spain 
2 17 411 
6992 9.0 
Total 
  185   
77966 100.0 
Note: *Hungary was a NUTS 1 country in 2010 and 2013 and is now at NUTS 2.  Netherlands was a NUTS 1 and 
NUTS 2 country in 2010 and 2013 respectively and is now at NUTS 1, yet NUTS 2 regions are calculated so as to make 
comparisons with 2013 data.  Finland, which has the same number of NUTS 2 regions (5), had one region split – (FI18 be-
came FI1B and FI1C), while two regions merged (FI13 and FI1A became FI1D), for which researchers should treat over time 
comparisons with caution. 
TABLE 2A, (COUNTRY LEVEL GOVERNANCE INDICATORS AND RANKINGS) 
2017 rank Country/Territory CoC RoL GEE VAA total AVE 
ST_AVE wit-
hin EU28 
previous 
rank rank change 
1 FINLAND 2.28 2.07 1.82 1.56 1.93 1.446 2 1 
2 SWEDEN 2.25 2.04 1.81 1.60 1.92 1.428 3 1 
3 DENMARK 2.23 2.04 1.85 1.57 1.92 1.425 1 -2 
4 NETHERLANDS 1.89 1.93 1.84 1.57 1.81 1.232 4 0 
5 LUXEMBOURG 2.12 1.86 1.72 1.52 1.81 1.226 5 0 
6 GERMANY 1.82 1.78 1.74 1.43 1.69 1.034 7 1 
7 UK 1.87 1.81 1.74 1.27 1.67 0.995 8 1 
8 IRELAND 1.64 1.79 1.54 1.35 1.58 0.839 9 1 
9 AUSTRIA 1.49 1.85 1.47 1.40 1.55 0.796 6 -3 
10 BELGIUM 1.58 1.42 1.44 1.39 1.46 0.636 10 0 
11 FRANCE 1.28 1.41 1.44 1.18 1.33 0.413 11 0 
12 ESTONIA 1.25 1.33 1.09 1.17 1.21 0.213 15 3 
13 PORTUGAL 0.92 1.14 1.23 1.12 1.10 0.031 16 3 
14 MALTA 0.92 1.15 0.85 1.18 1.03 -0.101 13 -1 
15 CYPRUS 0.98 1.01 1.04 1.04 1.02 -0.116 12 -3 
16 LITHUANIA 0.56 0.98 1.20 0.97 0.93 -0.270 22 6 
17 SLOVENIA 0.73 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.90 -0.317 17 0 
18 CZECH REPUBLIC 0.39 1.12 1.05 1.02 0.90 -0.323 18 0 
19 SPAIN 0.49 0.90 1.18 1.02 0.89 -0.325 14 -5 
20 POLAND 0.58 0.80 0.80 1.04 0.81 -0.478 19 -1 
21 LATVIA 0.40 0.79 1.10 0.82 0.78 -0.527 23 2 
22 SLOVAK REP. 0.15 0.48 0.84 0.97 0.61 -0.812 20 -2 
23 ITALY -0.05 0.25 0.45 1.01 0.42 -1.138 24 1 
24 HUNGARY 0.10 0.40 0.49 0.52 0.38 -1.203 21 -3 
25 CROATIA 0.20 0.20 0.51 0.50 0.35 -1.248 26 1 
26 GREECE -0.13 0.24 0.25 0.59 0.24 -1.444 25 -1 
27 ROMANIA -0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.43 0.12 -1.637 28 1 
28 BULGARIA -0.31 -0.12 0.22 0.39 0.04 -1.777 27 -1 
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Note: colors represent six groups, determined by hierarchical cluster analysis (Ward’s Linkage, squared Euclidean distancing)  
TABLE 3A, (PAIRWISE CORRELATION MATRIX OF THE 18 EQI INDICATORS)  
  stEdQual stHelQual stLawQual stEdImpart1 stHelImpart1 stLawImpart1 stEdImpart2 stHelImpart2 
stEdQual           
stHelQual 0.641         
stLawQual 0.711 0.818        
stEdImpart1 0.310 0.177 0.139       
stHelImpart1 0.346 0.430 0.270 0.729      
stLawImpart1 0.391 0.466 0.427 0.755 0.776     
stEdImpart2 0.628 0.469 0.399 0.566 0.497 0.415    
stHelImpart2 0.592 0.794 0.573 0.352 0.744 0.528 0.655   
stLawImpart2 0.545 0.575 0.601 0.559 0.618 0.730 0.750 0.675  
stEdCorr 0.322 0.384 0.251 0.674 0.608 0.778 0.381 0.434  
stHelCorr 0.392 0.604 0.393 0.507 0.737 0.776 0.334 0.684  
stLawCorr 0.355 0.444 0.373 0.682 0.680 0.907 0.392 0.492  
stNeedCorr 0.305 0.557 0.383 0.618 0.675 0.810 0.494 0.581  
stGreedCorr 0.261 0.451 0.243 0.512 0.637 0.718 0.450 0.517  
stElecCorr 0.362 0.250 0.238 0.606 0.502 0.551 0.626 0.392  
stTaxImpart 0.376 0.213 0.153 0.686 0.510 0.523 0.611 0.367  
stnoAskB_any 0.494 0.673 0.651 0.175 0.311 0.452 0.355 0.535  
stnoPayB_any 0.243 0.520 0.375 -0.063 0.250 0.283 0.157 0.418  
          
  stLawImpart2 stEdCorr stHelCorr stLawCorr stNeedCorr stGreedCorr stElecCorr stTaxImpart stnoAskB_any 
           
stLawImpart2           
stEdCorr 0.467         
stHelCorr 0.510 0.881        
stLawCorr 0.666 0.917 0.874       
stNeedCorr 0.702 0.840 0.842 0.891      
stGreedCorr 0.611 0.727 0.775 0.792 0.906     
stElecCorr 0.646 0.557 0.432 0.589 0.671 0.631    
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stTaxImpart 0.540 0.459 0.348 0.483 0.509 0.468 0.745   
stnoAskB_any 0.515 0.509 0.585 0.533 0.597 0.456 0.309 0.136  
stnoPayB_any 0.304 0.308 0.497 0.333 0.477 0.537 0.067 -0.111 0.695 
 
 
TABLE 4A, (EQI DATA 2010, 2013 AND FULL 2017 BY COUNTRY AND REGIONS)  
nuts name 
EQI_2017 Quality_17 
Impartia-
lity_17 
Corrupt-
ion_17 EQI_2013 EQI_2010 
AT Austria 0.807    0.820 1.063 
AT11 Burgenland 0.792 0.385 1.315 0.575 0.945 1.310 
AT12 Niederöstrerreich 0.727 0.448 1.064 0.582 0.998 1.062 
AT13 Wien 0.862 0.709 1.050 0.727 0.391 1.088 
AT21 Kärnten 0.657 0.355 0.993 0.542 0.778 1.213 
AT22 Steiermark 0.763 0.611 0.952 0.637 1.010 0.936 
AT31 Oberösterreich 0.705 0.713 0.701 0.625 0.886 0.984 
AT32 Salzburg 0.896 0.833 1.031 0.723 0.778 0.964 
AT33 Tirol 1.032 1.271 1.066 0.647 1.247 1.192 
AT34 Voralberg 1.087 0.844 1.373 0.917 0.452 1.135 
BE Belgium 0.615    0.629 0.345 
be1 Brussels -0.109 -0.343 -0.477 0.516 0.043 -0.416 
be2 Vlaams Gewest 0.970 1.125 0.875 0.802 1.088 0.733 
be3 Wallonie 0.217 0.082 -0.215 0.772 0.001 -0.098 
BG Bulgaria -1.733    -1.860 -1.902 
BG31 Severozapaden -2.270 -2.113 -2.781 -1.654 -2.270 -2.655 
BG32 Severen Tsentralen -0.997 -1.581 -0.955 -0.347 -1.677 -2.200 
BG33 Severoiztochen -1.366 -1.317 -1.524 -1.104 -0.467 -1.195 
BG34 Yugoiztochen -2.187 -1.814 -1.957 -2.561 -1.860 -2.275 
BG41 Yugozapaden -1.881 -1.778 -1.676 -1.992 -2.817 -2.016 
BG42 Yuzhen Tsentralen -1.548 -1.272 -2.264 -0.921 -1.245 -1.344 
CY Cyprus -0.106 -0.134 -0.215 0.044 0.011 0.198 
CZ Czech Rep. -0.294    -0.498 -0.582 
CZ01 Praha -0.161 0.153 0.104 -0.728 -0.534 -1.016 
CZ02 Stredni Cechy -0.650 -0.075 -0.940 -0.856 -0.486 -0.410 
CZ03 Jihozapad -0.287 -0.250 0.115 -0.707 -0.344 -0.212 
CZ04 Severozapad -0.992 -0.740 -0.869 -1.262 -0.989 -1.007 
CZ05 Severovychod -0.167 -0.247 0.280 -0.527 -0.388 -0.302 
CZ06 Jihovychod 0.018 0.066 0.382 -0.406 -0.277 -0.598 
CZ07 Stedni Morava -0.017 -0.081 0.315 -0.299 -0.452 -0.675 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko -0.273 -0.085 -0.031 -0.681 -0.662 -0.527 
DE Germany 1.012    0.770 0.773 
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de1 Baden Wuttemberg 1.074 1.238 0.833 1.041 0.889 0.877 
de2 Bavaria 1.338 1.924 0.809 1.152 0.946 0.648 
de3 Berlin 0.612 0.008 0.742 1.015 0.410 0.869 
de4 Brandenburg 0.740 0.372 0.874 0.890 0.511 0.864 
de5 Bremen 1.098 0.632 1.407 1.127 0.753 0.847 
de6 Hamburg 1.245 1.316 1.096 1.193 0.688 0.853 
de7 Hessen 1.066 0.888 1.145 1.046 0.755 0.565 
de8 Mecklenburg-Vorpommen 1.169 0.975 1.333 1.067 0.750 0.840 
de9 Lower Saxony 1.247 1.200 1.286 1.119 0.965 0.830 
dea North Rhine Westphalia 0.757 0.483 0.704 1.003 0.636 0.648 
deb Rhineland-Palatinate 1.128 1.205 1.025 1.035 0.931 0.732 
dec Saarland 1.034 0.984 0.847 1.166 0.927 0.932 
ded Saxony 0.819 0.615 0.787 0.967 0.710 0.969 
dee Saxony-Anhalt 0.588 0.288 0.636 0.776 0.322 0.771 
def Schleswig-Holstein 1.108 0.875 1.249 1.078 0.995 1.129 
deg Thuringia 0.949 0.871 0.885 0.991 0.425 1.181 
DK Denmark 1.399    1.545 1.549 
DK01 Hovedstaden 1.339 1.097 1.197 1.584 1.518 1.431 
DK02 Sjaelland 1.230 0.861 1.145 1.553 1.347 1.557 
DK03 Syddanmark 1.361 1.239 1.209 1.491 1.576 1.542 
DK04 Midtylland 1.647 1.674 1.528 1.566 1.638 1.762 
DK05 Nordjylland 1.350 1.164 1.322 1.420 1.636 1.441 
EE Estonia 0.232 0.054 0.248 0.369 -0.052 -0.103 
ES Spain -0.328    -0.047 -0.054 
ES11 Galicia -0.431 -0.194 -0.309 -0.747 -0.511 0.432 
ES12 Principado de Asturias 0.220 0.529 0.387 -0.286 0.423 0.371 
ES13 Cantabria 0.426 0.631 0.726 -0.133 0.407 0.048 
ES21 Pais Vasco 0.653 0.948 0.672 0.268 0.283 0.511 
ES22 Navarra 0.502 0.732 0.486 0.235 0.263 0.073 
ES23 La Rioja 0.242 0.885 0.104 -0.284 0.368 0.137 
ES24 Aragón 0.097 0.380 0.097 -0.195 0.111 0.204 
ES30 Comunidad de Madrid -0.222 0.494 -0.452 -0.679 0.262 -0.153 
ES41 Castilla y León -0.326 0.309 -0.689 -0.552 0.243 -0.130 
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha -0.300 -0.127 -0.223 -0.519 -0.221 0.107 
ES43 Extremadura 0.022 0.353 -0.023 -0.264 0.144 0.289 
ES51 Cataluña -0.392 -0.168 -0.445 -0.520 -0.181 -0.480 
ES52 Comunidad Valenciana -0.446 -0.046 -0.564 -0.678 -0.275 0.053 
ES53 Illes Balears -0.544 -0.429 -0.411 -0.738 -0.026 0.019 
ES61 Andalucia -0.740 -0.606 -0.805 -0.728 -0.119 -0.251 
ES62 Región de Murcia -0.136 0.302 -0.143 -0.551 0.326 0.164 
ES63 Ceuta (ES)       
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ES64 Melilla (ES)       
ES70 Canarias (ES) -0.709 -0.814 -0.471 -0.773 -0.574 0.163 
FI Finland 1.427    1.497 1.398 
FI13 Itä-Suomi      1.419 1.398 
FI18 Etelä-Suomi      1.525 1.398 
FI19 Länsi-Suomi 1.494 1.203 1.269 1.597 1.496 1.398 
FI1A Pohjois-Suomi     1.521 1.398 
FI20 Åland 2.323 2.033 2.176 2.512 2.639 1.398 
FI1B Helsinki-Uusimaa 1.335 1.106 1.218 1.540  1.398 
FI1C Etelä-Suomi 1.406 1.315 1.407 1.602  1.398 
FI1D Pohjois- ja Itä-Suomi 1.441 1.114 1.380 1.676  1.398 
FR France 0.408    0.421 0.690 
FR10 Ile-de-France 0.498 0.343 0.486 0.612 0.401 0.536 
FR21 Champagne-Ardenne 0.336 0.464 0.175 0.338 0.258 0.211 
FR22 Picardie 0.406 0.194 0.377 0.605 0.258 0.463 
FR23 Haute-Normandie 0.453 0.524 0.280 0.510 0.319 0.153 
FR24 Centre 0.420 0.328 0.443 0.443 0.774 0.595 
FR25 Basse-Normandie 0.391 0.304 0.495 0.328 0.683 0.496 
FR26 Bourgogne 0.283 0.162 0.228 0.430 0.289 0.474 
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.290 0.637 0.074 0.136 0.145 0.531 
FR41 Lorraine 0.233 0.479 -0.109 0.316 0.359 0.262 
FR42 Alsace 0.377 0.648 0.128 0.321 0.555 0.468 
FR43 Franche-Comte 0.185 0.164 0.209 0.162 0.511 0.483 
FR51 Pays de la Loire 0.719 0.694 0.712 0.674 0.577 0.362 
FR52 Bretagne 0.768 0.795 0.744 0.683 0.961 0.973 
FR53 Poitou-Charentes 0.319 0.446 0.169 0.313 0.723 0.733 
FR61 Aquitaine 0.693 0.850 0.513 0.648 0.767 0.779 
FR62 Midi-Pyrenees 0.434 0.381 0.471 0.403 0.722 0.394 
FR63 Limousin 0.619 0.587 0.642 0.561 0.546 0.692 
FR71 Rhone-Alpes 0.577 0.635 0.489 0.548 0.624 0.752 
FR72 Auvergne 0.440 0.490 0.370 0.416 0.693 0.550 
FR81 Languedoc-Roussillon 0.130 0.225 0.162 -0.012 0.369 0.522 
FR82 Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 0.215 0.259 0.377 -0.020 0.058 0.232 
FR83 Corse 0.074 -0.091 0.318 -0.020 0.180 0.152 
FR91 Guadeloupe -1.030 -1.294 -1.014 -0.672 -0.402 -0.484 
FR92 Martinique -0.728 -0.835 -0.886 -0.379 -0.101 -0.358 
FR93 Guyane -1.554 -2.700 -1.191 -0.613 -0.617 -0.449 
FR94 Reunion -0.412 -0.221 -0.322 -0.651 -0.100 -0.106 
EL Greece -1.387    -0.326 -0.300 
EL5 Voreia Ellada -1.708 -1.756 -1.737 -1.445 -1.142 -1.333 
EL6 Kentriki Ellada -1.235 -1.181 -1.069 -1.325 -1.213 -1.040 
  35 
EL3 Attica -1.212 -1.302 -1.153 -1.053 -1.297 -0.343 
EL4 Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti -1.462 -1.262 -1.378 -1.590 -0.906 -0.909 
HR Croatia -1.214    -1.003 -0.997 
HR03 Jadranska Hrvatska -1.159 -1.225 -1.282 -0.839 -1.503 -1.494 
HR04 Kontinentalna Hrvatska -1.242 -1.224 -1.431 -0.929 -1.294 -1.494 
HU Hungary -1.150    -0.564  
HU10 Közép-Magyarország -1.454 -1.469 -1.312 -1.427 -0.972 -1.046 
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl -0.965 -1.334 -0.660 -0.807 -0.689 -0.391 
HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl -1.016 -1.237 -1.010 -0.693 -0.607 -0.417 
HU23 Dél-Dunántúl -0.980 -0.961 -0.956 -0.917 -0.607 -0.417 
HU31 Észak-Magyarország -1.088 -1.481 -0.925 -0.745 -0.802 -0.524 
HU32 Észak-Alföld -1.270 -1.019 -1.565 -1.080 -0.802 -0.524 
HU33 Dél-Alföld -0.747 -0.769 -0.717 -0.677 -0.802 -0.524 
IE Ireland 0.840      
IE01 
Border, Midland and Wes-
tern 0.902 0.844 0.901 0.862 0.844 0.797 
IE02 Southern and Eastern 0.818 0.639 0.918 0.806 0.621 0.586 
IT Italy -1.132      
ITC1 Piemonte -1.193 -0.769 -1.509 -1.163 -0.878 -0.324 
ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -0.671 -1.417 -0.098 -0.444 -0.894 -0.815 
ITC3 Ligura -1.253 -0.589 -1.433 -1.595 -1.057 -0.665 
ITC4 Lombardia -0.488 0.512 -1.098 -0.806 -0.773 -0.781 
ITH1 Bolzano -0.362 -0.496 -0.151 -0.405 0.686 0.526 
ITH2 Trento -0.362 -0.496 -0.151 -0.405 0.720 0.268 
ITH3 Veneto -0.462 0.399 -0.728 -1.000 -0.433 -0.621 
ITH4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia -0.489 -0.353 -0.540 -0.519 0.092 -0.037 
ITH5 Emilia-Romagna -0.460 -0.028 -0.766 -0.528 -0.464 -0.518 
ITI1 Toscana -0.852 -0.942 -1.049 -0.466 -0.760 -0.704 
ITI2 Umbria -1.510 -1.418 -1.481 -1.468 -0.725 -0.383 
ITI3 Marche -1.379 -1.398 -0.890 -1.714 -0.760 -0.624 
ITI4 Lazio -1.531 -1.353 -1.691 -1.380 -1.679 -1.340 
ITF1 Abruzzo -1.966 -2.404 -0.779 -2.539 -1.291 -1.023 
ITF2 Molise -1.181 -0.787 -0.868 -1.768 -1.822 -1.308 
ITF3 Campania -1.879 -1.642 -2.004 -1.783 -2.370 -2.284 
ITF4 Puglia -1.546 -1.096 -1.587 -1.786 -1.771 -1.756 
ITF5 Basilicata -1.659 -1.766 -0.889 -2.168 -1.602 -1.333 
ITF6 Calabria -2.185 -2.574 -2.293 -1.449 -1.845 -2.167 
ITG1 Sicilia -1.549 -1.381 -1.875 -1.212 -1.749 -1.843 
ITG2 Sardegna -1.230 -1.186 -0.813 -1.572 -1.488 -0.999 
LT Lithuania -0.264 -0.043 -0.253 -0.467 -0.809 -0.992 
LU Luxembourgh 1.199 1.051 1.019 1.401 1.223 1.031 
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LV Latvia -0.514 -0.298 -0.533 -0.654 -0.885 -0.937 
MT Malta -0.074 -0.179 -0.003 -0.034 0.028 0.297 
NL Netherlands 1.204    1.198 1.093 
nl11 Groningen 1.353 1.357 1.426 1.127 1.296 1.430 
nl12 Friesland (NL) 1.353 1.357 1.426 1.127 1.333 1.430 
nl13 Drenthe 1.353 1.357 1.426 1.127 1.120 1.430 
nl21 Overijssel 1.331 1.273 1.362 1.214 1.530 1.030 
nl22 Gelderland 1.331 1.273 1.362 1.214 1.226 1.030 
nl23 Flevoland 1.331 1.273 1.362 1.214 1.191 1.030 
nl31 Utrecht 1.103 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.333 1.122 
nl32 Noord-Holland 1.103 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.114 1.122 
nl33 Zuid-Holland 1.103 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.274 1.122 
nl34 Zeeland 1.103 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.173 1.122 
nl41 Noord-Brabant 1.227 1.420 1.060 1.071 1.154 0.945 
nl42 Limburg (NL) 1.227 1.420 1.060 1.071 1.210 0.945 
PL Poland -0.462    -0.579 -0.864 
PL11 Lodzkie -0.661 -0.474 -0.757 -0.676 -0.782 -0.878 
PL12 Mazowieckie -0.523 -0.477 -0.648 -0.384 -0.826 -1.014 
PL21 Malopolskie -0.402 -0.267 -0.472 -0.422 -0.567 -0.913 
PL22 Slaskie -0.481 -0.390 -0.594 -0.405 -0.933 -1.123 
PL31 Lubelskie -0.634 -0.300 -0.891 -0.635 -0.687 -0.931 
PL32 Podkarpackie -0.627 -0.332 -0.725 -0.755 -0.801 -0.886 
PL33 Swietokrzyskie -0.513 -0.407 -0.680 -0.391 -0.731 -0.842 
PL34 Podlaskie -0.458 -0.075 -0.727 -0.517 -0.399 -0.979 
PL41 Wielkopolskie -0.466 -0.364 -0.754 -0.222 -0.666 -1.019 
PL42 Zachodniopomorskie -0.370 -0.178 -0.565 -0.320 -0.543 -0.907 
PL43 Lubuskie -0.409 -0.711 -0.267 -0.210 -0.433 -0.955 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie -0.482 -0.509 -0.380 -0.507 -0.936 -1.120 
PL52 Opolskie -0.295 -0.379 -0.065 -0.416 -0.250 -0.672 
PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie -0.335 -0.535 -0.082 -0.360 -0.289 -0.973 
PL62 Warminsko-Mazurskie -0.341 -0.423 -0.199 -0.369 -0.500 -0.723 
PL63 Pomorskie -0.131 -0.034 0.096 -0.447 -0.425 -0.890 
PT Portugal 0.031    -0.004 -0.022 
PT11 Norte -0.067 0.368 -0.359 -0.193 -0.295 -0.411 
PT15 Algarve -0.290 -0.891 -0.040 0.085 0.148 0.073 
PT16 Centro 0.072 -0.014 0.307 -0.092 -0.131 -0.153 
PT17 Lisboa 0.108 0.123 0.091 0.099 -0.231 0.005 
PT18 Alentejo 0.247 0.056 0.292 0.365 0.777 0.535 
PT20 Açores 0.008 0.200 -0.112 -0.062 0.406 0.337 
PT30 Madeira 0.166 0.745 -0.192 -0.063 -0.066 0.124 
RO Romania -1.555    -1.658 -1.588 
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RO11 Nord-Vest -1.851 -1.811 -2.015 -1.523 -1.907 -1.197 
RO12 Centru -1.434 -1.591 -1.430 -1.127 -1.369 -1.596 
RO21 Nord-Est -1.577 -1.803 -1.237 -1.531 -1.940 -1.986 
RO22 Sud-Est -1.975 -1.896 -2.141 -1.669 -2.186 -2.001 
RO31 Sud-Muntenia -1.104 -1.538 -1.079 -0.577 -1.758 -1.768 
RO32 Bucuresti-Ilfov -1.576 -2.422 -1.237 -0.908 -2.465 -2.838 
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia -1.614 -2.046 -1.524 -1.100 -1.932 -1.504 
RO42 Vest -1.337 -1.910 -0.909 -1.059 -1.869 -2.191 
SE Sweden 1.402    0.887 0.795 
SE1 Östra Sverige 1.415 1.260 1.253 1.584 1.468 1.289 
SE2 Södra Sverige 1.439 1.238 1.366 1.560 1.443 1.361 
SE3 Norra Sverige 1.281 1.083 1.128 1.497 1.323 1.186 
SI Slovenia -0.294 -0.297 -0.292 -0.260 -0.200 -0.196 
SK Slovakia -0.813    -0.706 -0.673 
SK01 Bratislavský kraj -0.956 -0.605 -1.121 -1.034 -0.920 -0.632 
SK02 Západné Slovensko -1.014 -0.531 -1.106 -1.293 -0.721 -0.889 
SK03 Stredné Slovensko -0.628 -0.202 -0.765 -0.845 -0.728 -0.802 
SK04 Východné Slovensko -0.684 -0.379 -0.949 -0.644 -0.981 -0.808 
UK United Kingdom 0.986    0.678 0.680 
ukc Northeast England 1.129 1.167 1.068 1.033 0.625 0.751 
ukd Northwest England 0.751 0.829 0.545 0.803 0.766 0.858 
uke Yorkshire-Humber 0.924 0.859 0.763 1.056 0.841 0.520 
ukf East Midland England 0.892 0.706 0.713 1.167 0.609 1.045 
ukg West Midland England 1.134 0.920 1.241 1.116 0.577 0.647 
ukh East of England 1.074 0.836 0.994 1.277 0.813 0.617 
uki London 1.002 0.972 0.823 1.109 0.903 0.368 
ukj South East England 1.033 0.895 0.930 1.166 0.963 0.903 
ukk South West England 1.125 0.738 1.210 1.303 0.451 0.908 
ukl Wales 1.049 0.541 1.320 1.165 0.331 0.656 
ukm Scotland 0.978 0.772 1.073 0.981 0.543 1.071 
ukn N. Ireland 0.561 -0.331 0.787 1.162 0.651 0.768 
 
Note: for the 21 countries with regional data, a country’s score calculated as the population weighted mean of its regions 
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TABLE 5A, (POSITIVE CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL EQI PILLARS)  
 Nuts code Region name 𝜷𝒓 t-score p value 
QUALITY           
  BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.816 3.69 0.000 
  DE2 Bayern 0.594 2.69 0.008 
  ITC4 Lombardia 0.514 2.32 0.021 
  ES30 Madrid 0.499 2.26 0.025 
  ES23 La Rioja 0.471 2.13 0.034 
  BG34 Yugoiztochen 0.452 2.04 0.042 
  UKI London 0.122 2.32 0.022 
  LT Lithuania 0.388 1.76 0.080 
  CZ01 Prague 0.388 1.75 0.081 
  PL34 Podlaskie 0.381 1.72 0.086 
  ITF4 Puglia 0.381 1.72 0.087 
  RO31 Sud-Muntenia 0.379 1.71 0.088 
IMPARTIALITY         
  RO42 Vest 0.793 3.34 0.001 
  RO32 Bucharesti 0.762 3.21 0.002 
  PL63 Pomorskie 0.684 2.88 0.004 
  PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.631 2.66 0.008 
  CZ07 Střední Morava 0.603 2.54 0.012 
  BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.566 2.39 0.018 
  CZ06 Jihovychod 0.527 2.22 0.027 
  ITF2 Molise 0.489 2.06 0.040 
  CZ01 Prague 0.479 2.02 0.045 
 DE7  Hessen 0.478 2.02 0.045 
 PL51 Dolnoslaskie 0.476 2.01 0.046 
 PL22 Slaskie 0.462 1.95 0.053 
 PL43 Lubuskie 0.459 1.93 0.055 
 CZ05 Severovýchod 0.450 1.90 0.059 
 UK22 Wales 0.437 1.84 0.067 
 ES13 Cantabria 0.431 1.82 0.071 
 PL22 Slaskie 0.431 1.82 0.071 
 PL62 Warmińsko-mazurskie 0.428 1.80 0.073 
 BG41 Yugozapaden 0.427 1.80 0.073 
 DE2 Bayern 0.400 1.69 0.093 
 BE1 Brussels 0.394 1.66 0.098 
CORRUPTION         
 RO32 Bucharesti 0.989 4.79 0.000 
 BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.496 2.40 0.017 
 CZ01 Prague 0.494 2.39 0.018 
 PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 0.448 2.17 0.031 
 LT Lithuania 0.430 2.08 0.038 
 PL41 Wielkopolskie 0.420 2.03 0.043 
 PL22 Slaskie 0.415 2.01 0.046 
 ITF6 Calabria 0.410 1.98 0.049 
 RO42 Vest 0.387 1.87 0.063 
 BE3 Wallonie 0.385 1.86 0.064 
 RO31 Sud-Muntenia 0.365 1.77 0.078 
 UKI London 0.362 1.75 0.081 
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 BE1 Brussels 0.358 1.74 0.084 
 CZ06 Jihovychod 0.350 1.69 0.092 
 PL43 Lubuskie 0.344 1.67 0.097 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6A, (NEGATIVE CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL EQI PILLARS) 
 Nuts code Region name 𝜷𝒓 t-score p value 
QUALITY      
 FR93 Guyane -1.210 -5.47 0.000 
 ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -1.139 -5.15 0.000 
 ITF1 Abruzzo -0.803 -3.63 0.000 
 HU31 Észak-Magyarország -0.542 -2.45 0.015 
 AT11 Burgenland -0.533 -2.41 0.017 
 UKN N. Ireland -0.506 -2.29 0.023 
 DE3 Berlin -0.531 -2.40 0.017 
 FR91 Martinique -0.486 -2.20 0.029 
 FR92 Guyane -0.479 -2.17 0.031 
 HU21 Közép-Dunántúl -0.406 -1.84 0.068 
 ES70 Canarias -0.432 -1.96 0.052 
 BG33 Severoiztochen -0.387 -1.75 0.081 
 FR22 Picardie -0.379 -1.71 0.088 
 FR43 Franche-Comté -0.376 -1.70 0.091 
IMPARTIALITY     
 FR93 Guyane -0.639 -2.70 0.008 
 HU32 Észak-Alföld -0.468 -1.97 0.050 
 ITC1 Piemonte -0.452 -1.91 0.058 
 ES11 Galacia -0.410 -1.73 0.085 
CORRUPTION     
 ITF1 Abruzzo -0.756 -3.66 0.000 
 ES11 Galacia -0.580 -2.81 0.005 
 ITC3 Liguria -0.493 -2.39 0.018 
 ES30 Madrid -0.484 -2.34 0.020 
 ITF5 Basilicata -0.460 -2.23 0.027 
 ES70 Canarias -0.437 -2.11 0.036 
 BG34 Yugoiztochen -0.425 -2.06 0.041 
 ITG2 Sardegna -0.417 -2.02 0.045 
 ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -0.416 -2.02 0.045 
 RO11 Nord Vest -0.408 -1.97 0.050 
 AT21 Kärnten -0.354 -1.72 0.088 
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 ES53 Illes Balears -0.351 -1.70 0.091 
 ITF2 Molise -0.344 -1.67 0.097 
 
 
